1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
2	FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al,)
4	Plaintiffs)
5	-VS-) CA No. 16-11372-PBS
6) Pages 1 - 79 JAMES F. ALLEN, et al,
7	Defendants)
8	
9	MOTION HEARING
10	BEFORE THE HONORABLE PATTI B. SARIS
11	UNITED STATES CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE
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15	United States District Court
16	1 Courthouse Way, Courtroom 19 Boston, Massachusetts 02210
17	May 1, 2018, 10:09 a.m.
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22	LEE A. MARZILLI
23	OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER United States District Court
24	1 Courthouse Way, Room 7200 Boston, MA 02210
25	(617) 345-6787

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1 PROCEEDINGS THE CLERK: Court calls Civil Action 16-11372, United 2 States v. Alere Home, et al. Could counsel please identify 3 themselves. 4 5 MR. DeNINNO: Good morning, your Honor. Andrew 6 DeNinno on behalf of the plaintiff relator. 7 MS. McETTRICK: Good morning, your Honor. Jacquelyn McEttrick on behalf of the plaintiff. 8 MR. KRAUS: Good morning. Lawrence Kraus for mdINR. 9 10 MR. KASSOF: Good morning, your Honor. Andrew Kassof for Alere Home Monitoring. 11 12 MR. PEARLSTEIN: Good morning, your Honor. Mark Perlstein for Roche. 13 14 MR. GELB: Good morning, your Honor. Richard Gelb for CardioLink. 15 MS. SHANAHAN: Good morning, your Honor. Sara 16 Shanahan for Patient Home Monitoring. 17 18 MS. THORVALDSEN: Good morning, your Honor. Kara 19 Thorvaldsen for US Healthcare Supply and Advanced Cardio Services. 20 21 THE COURT: All right, thank you. You may be seated. 22 Have you worked out among yourselves an order? 23 MR. PEARLSTEIN: Yes, your Honor. So I will be going 24 first on behalf of Roche, and then it will be Alere, mdINR, and

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then that's number four.

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              MS. SHANAHAN: Patient Home Monitoring, your Honor.
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              MR. GELB: I guess we're going last, your Honor.
              THE COURT: And so how long do you each need because I
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     need to make sure I have enough time for everybody because I
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     need to give plaintiffs fair time, and you may want a brief
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     rebuttal?
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              MR. PEARLSTEIN: So mine may be longer than some, but
     I'm going to do it in 20 minutes or less.
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              THE COURT: If you do it by 10:30 -- we just need to
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     script this out -- let's say each one of you gets ten minutes
     and then you get the remainder of the time, does that make
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     sense from your point of view?
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              MR. DeNINNO: Your Honor, I'm not sure I follow the
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     remainder.
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              THE COURT: So it sounds as if 10:30, we'd be done
     with the rest by 11:30, and you'd get at least a half an hour.
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              MR. DeNINNO: To respond to all seven of the
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     defendants?
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              THE COURT: Or do you think it makes sense -- that's
     why I'm asking you -- to get going? Would you rather respond
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     person by person?
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              MR. DeNINNO: I think it might make sense to do it
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     that way, your Honor.
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              THE COURT: My concern about that is, just saying, we
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     may not get through everyone, so that's why I'm trying to in
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advance. I'm happy to go that way, but let's say 20 and -- I won't have time. I'm hoping we're not going to hear the same thing from each one. How do you want to handle it? Would you prefer to go after each one?

MR. DeNINNO: My preference would be to go after each one. I don't think we'll need a full 20 minutes to respond to Roche, and I certainly think that as we progress, that a lot of the same issues will repeat themselves.

THE COURT: I do think that they will. All right, so why don't we take Roche first, and then we'll keep going. And there's nothing earth-shatteringly urgent about this. If I don't finish everybody, I'll schedule another time for the remaining two. I have to be out of here by 1:00 o'clock, and I think we should be able to finish it in that time frame.

MR. DeNINNO: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. PEARLSTEIN: Thank you, your Honor. The theory that's being advanced here by the relator is essentially an attack on Roche's decision to limit the frequency that it will support for its testing service for patients who are on Warfarin. It's simply not actionable, and there really are three core reasons for that, your Honor. One, the patient order form -- and there are different versions, but the earliest one is attached as Exhibit F to the amended complaint -- is clear and transparent, and unlike cases we'll talk about a little bit later, no physician has allegedly been

misled by that order form. The choices that it provides are clear.

Secondly, federal law unambiguously allows providers to determine what services they will provide, and nothing about the theory advanced here alters or in any way should modify that.

And, third, the whole notion of coercion in this case is simply implausible. As the materials that the relator has submitted demonstrate, home testing, the testing that's at issue here, represents a tiny segment of the market for testing services available to Warfarin patients. In that circumstance, where so many other options are available to physicians and their patients, including the relator in this case, the notion that limiting this one narrow segment of the market, limiting it in terms of the services offered is in any way coercive is simply implausible, and saying it does not make it actionable.

Let me just sketch out a few background facts. I don't think you're going to hear these from anybody else, your Honor. So Warfarin is an anticoagulant. It is prescribed to inhibit clotting. There are three conditions for which Medicare patients can receive — well, so testing needs to take place for Warfarin, and the reason for that is, Warfarin is an anticlotting agent, but if there's too much Warfarin, it can result in uncontrolled bleeding. So there's a risk of stroke if it's at too low a level, and there's a risk of uncontrolled

bleeding if it's at too high a level.

Medicare allows reimbursement for patients who test for three conditions: those with a mechanical heart valve, those with atrial fibrillation, those with deep vein thrombosis. In 2006 FDA issued a black box warning which urged physicians to regularly test patients who are on Warfarin for just this reason; and there are a range of views among physicians about the appropriate testing frequency, when patients are to be regarded as stable, and therefore able to be maintained on a lower frequency.

The test settings, your Honor, include home, but, as we said, home testing represents a tiny slice of the market. The 2008 CMS decision that expanded reimbursement says 5 percent. The Heneghan article from 2012 cited by relator said that only 1 percent of patients are testing at home. This particular percentage is not especially important. The key is that it is a distinct minority of patients who test at home. Most test in hospitals, in physicians' offices, or special anticoagulation clinics that are set up to provide this kind of testing. And indeed the relator, Mr. Allen, did just that. According to his complaint, he tested at a VA hospital, he tested at his physician's office in Buffalo, and then after he moved to Canandaigua, New York, about 100 miles away, he tested at a local hospital there. So he along with other patients has multiple options available in addition to home testing.

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              Reimbursement for home testing, your Honor, it's sort
     of an unusual system. If a patient enrolls, the patient will
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     receive a testing meter and strips. There is no charge for the
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     provision of the meter and the strips. Every four tests are
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     grouped together in a billing unit under a code. It's G249.
     And the notion is that through the reimbursement for the
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     testing, the companies that are providing this service will
     ultimately recover the cost of the meter and the strips.
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     Medicare recognizes that up to weekly testing can be an
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     appropriate frequency for patients because Medicare authorizes
     reimbursement for patients at that frequency.
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              As to the relator, Mr. Allen, who is the only
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     patient --
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              THE COURT: Does Medicare ever say it's unnecessary to
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     do it once the Warfarin has been testing appropriately for a
     period of time?
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              MR. PEARLSTEIN: It doesn't. It simply states once
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     per week, and while I don't think --
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              THE COURT: It doesn't ever say "but it's unnecessary
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     in a lot of patients"?
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              MR. PEARLSTEIN: So that's a determination that
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     physicians make --
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              THE COURT: I understand, but does Medicare have
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     quidelines on point?
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              MR. PEARLSTEIN: It does not. It simply -- what
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     Medicare does is authorize as frequently as once per week.
     does not provide any guidance that says "but walk that back if
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     X, Y or Z happens." It leaves it to the physician's judgment.
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     And, again, I think it's fair to say -- and we see it in the
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     studies that have been referenced in the papers, and you even
     see it in Dr. Riegel's care of Mr. Allen -- physicians have
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     different views about how to manage their patients.
              THE COURT: There's an argument that one of those
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     studies, the 2012, is misleading, or, more accurately, that
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     there's more recent information that makes that misleading to
     rely on.
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              MR. PEARLSTEIN: So it's actually the other way
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     around.
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              THE COURT: Is it the other way around? All right.
              MR. PEARLSTEIN: The 2006 Heneghan study is alleged to
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     have been misleading. The 2012 study which relator points to
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     actually doesn't support that. As we lay out in our brief, it
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     specifically does not say, as they allege, that the earlier
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     study was disclaimed or is to be abandoned. What they said is
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     that the 2012 study supplements, it provides additional
     information about home monitoring. And the other point is, it
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     wasn't a repudiation of any --
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              THE COURT: Excuse me. That Heneghan study, where is
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     that? Is that on your website?
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              MR. PEARLSTEIN: No. So that's a good question
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     because there is an allusion in the -- several allusions in the
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     complaint to unspecified marketing material that had reference
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     to the Heneghan study.
              THE COURT: The 2006 one?
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              MR. PEARLSTEIN: The 2006 study, that's correct. But
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     it's not identified as to what that material was, to whom it
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     was circulated, or whether even a single physician was
     influenced by it, or whether even one claim resulted from, you
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     know, the unknown physician having been so influenced, and
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     there's just not much information about it.
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              THE COURT: Well, is it on your website?
              MR. PEARLSTEIN: I don't know the answer to that.
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              THE COURT: All right.
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              MR. PEARLSTEIN: So --
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              THE COURT: It's not alleged that it's on your
     website?
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              MR. PEARLSTEIN: It's not alleged as such, that's
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18
     right.
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              So Mr. Allen began testing with Roche in March, 2014,
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     and it's a fairly simple story.
              THE COURT: I actually -- just to make sure we move a
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     little more quickly, I read all of this, so I understand the
     situation with Mr. Allen and Roche and the doctor.
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              MR. PEARLSTEIN: Okay, all right, so then let me hit
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     the legal argument.
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THE COURT: Yes.

MR. PEARLSTEIN: So the physician order form, your Honor, unlike the order forms in other of the cases that have been cited to you, is absolutely clear and transparent. This is not an instance where physicians were deceived into ordering tests that they had not intended to order. It provided a clear frequency. And in fact the only physician who is referenced in the complaint, or the only physicians are physicians who treated Mr. Allen, do not claim to have been misled by the choices. The choices that Roche provided were once a week, twice a month, or two to four times a month. There's no ambiguity about that and no claim that they were at all deceived. There's no —

THE COURT: So is there a place to put in once a month?

MR. PEARLSTEIN: So there used to be because Roche did support once a month prior to this time. And in July, 2014, Dr. Riegel attempted to change the order. He said, "I had ordered two to four a month, and now I think once a month is appropriate," and Roche responded to that by saying, "We don't support that."

THE COURT: Well, where did he write that? I mean, is there a place on the form to say "other" or --

MR. PEARLSTEIN: There was a place on the form for "other," and Roche, having changed its policy to no longer

support once a month, eliminated the "other" option. But he tried it. Roche said "no," and Roche gave Mr. Allen until the end of September, 2014, to find other testing. And there's no allegation that any of the tests that were provided by Roche were medically unnecessary. They were all pursuant to the order form signed by Dr. Riegel.

Now, what relator says is -- and you see this in the affidavit of Dr. Riegel -- that he felt pressured, that he wanted this as an option for at least certain of his patients, and that's why he signed an order form saying two to four times a month. The problem with that from a False Claims Act perspective is that Roche was absolutely entitled to rely upon the physician's order, and the only reason that Roche would not have been entitled to rely upon that order is if it had information that contradicted the order, that indicated that in fact it wasn't --

THE COURT: Or there was something misleading on the form.

MR. PEARLSTEIN: Well, so if there's something misleading on the form; but if you look at the other examples, the second *Boston Heart* decision that Judge Walton decided in December, 2017, the *Berkeley Health* case, even the OIG guidance makes it clear that the lab that's conducting the test isn't in a position to assess medical necessity.

THE COURT: You know, I read that opinion. I thought

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it was really helpful, except then there's the final tag, 1 "unless there's something misleading that was provided to the doctor, " and I agree with both of those statements. MR. PEARLSTEIN: I agree with those statements too. 5 THE COURT: So you can rely on a doctor's prescription 6 or order --7 MR. PEARLSTEIN: That's right. THE COURT: -- unless the doctor was improperly induced by either false statements or a kickback or some such. 10 MR. PEARLSTEIN: That's right, but that's not this 11 case, and there's no evidence of that. 12 THE COURT: Well, there is some allegations on some of the other forms that there was something misleading. 13 14 MR. PEARLSTEIN: But not that Dr. Riegel was misled, and he's the single physician in this case. There's no 15 evidence whatsoever that he was misled. And in fact, to come 16 back to the Boston Heart case, Mr. Allen tried to fit himself 17 into the construct that Judge Walton ultimately described when 18 19 he contacted Roche and said, "I'm willing to test twice a month 20 even though it's not medically necessary." So in that 21 circumstance, you have a prescription for twice a month and 22 evidence that it's not medically necessary. And Roche's response was, "No, we are not going to do that." So Roche was 23 entitled to rely upon it. There was simply no falsity here 24 25 because every claim was medically necessary, your Honor.

The lab cases that have been cited to you are each readily distinguishable. We talked about Boston Heart. In the Bane case, the test form itself was misleading. It wasn't clear, it wasn't transparent, and it deceived doctors, at least at the 12(b)(6) stage. Family Medical Centers was a bundling together of medically unnecessary/necessary tests and standing orders that required tests, even if there was no actual physician order. The Downy case, the same thing about bundling, and physicians were allegedly misled into believing that these two combined tests both needed to be performed at the same time.

The key here is, it's just as you said: It's either that the physician's judgment was corrupted through a kickback or improper inducement, or the physician was deceived or misled. There's no allegations of that in this case.

Now, the relator claims doctors were coerced by this choice, and I touched on this earlier. It is implausible.

It's not as if home testing represents a majority of the market or is the sole option. Indeed, it is the smallest of the options, and, as Mr. Allen's experience demonstrates, he was able to test in other settings notwithstanding the Roche policy.

THE COURT: Well, it does put doctors in a bind, though, because suppose you have someone who's highly frail or elderly or lives a really far distance away and doesn't

otherwise have a ride, it puts the doctor in the catch-22. He orders four tests, or he assumes that the person is actually not going to get tested once a month.

MR. PEARLSTEIN: So there's two answers --

THE COURT: I mean, maybe it's just a horrible conundrum. That's different from a False Claims Act violation, but it does put pressure on the doctor.

MR. PEARLSTEIN: So I guess three responses to that:

One, it's not a False Claims Act violation. Two, the fact that a patient is elderly and frail in a lot of instances means that they're not well suited to conduct the home testing at all.

And, three, the physician's obligation to determine medical necessity is not changed by that. He or she still needs to make a good-faith judgment about what is required for the patient.

THE COURT: So you're saying that the -- I understand exactly what Dr. Riegel was saying. I mean, the doctor feels some pressure that for someone who doesn't have ready access to a clinic, the choice may not be between four and one; it may be between four and none.

MR. PEARLSTEIN: But that's not even our case because to take this example, and it's the only example we have in front of us, Mr. Allen moved 90 to 100 miles away from Dr. Riegel's clinic in Buffalo, but we know from Mr. Allen's affidavit that he tested in his new hometown, Canandaigua, at

1 the local hospital. So it is ultimately about convenience, patient convenience, nothing more than that, and it's not 2 actionable under the False Claims Act. 3 4 THE COURT: Well, it may be more than that. I mean, 5 maybe not just convenience; it's the ability. But, anyway, that may not be a False Claims Act problem. So we need to 7 finish this up. 8 MR. PEARLSTEIN: All right, so let me just hit on two 9 other points. One --10 THE COURT: Quickly, because then I need to get them, and we have so many people who want their day. 11 12 MR. PEARLSTEIN: So providers do not have an 13 obligation to provide any service that a doctor deems medically 14 necessary. That's their contention. Federal law is to the 15 contrary. THE COURT: Yes, I understand that. Okay. 16 MR. PEARLSTEIN: Okay. And then I've touched on the 17 18 false statement piece already. 19 THE COURT: Yes, because I'm going to ask them about 20 that because that is one of the ways of inducement is by -- I 21 mean, I had that in my Neurontin case where there was false and 22 I would say even fraudulent information being marketed directly

to the doctors, and that is one of the exceptions to this. So

I'm going to find out exactly what you're alleging with respect
to Roche.

MR. DeNINNO: Your Honor, I am going to get into just briefly our theory of the case. I would like to respond to -
THE COURT: That's fair, because that could be like an umbrella for all of them. Fair enough.

MR. DeNINNO: I would like to respond to at least one of the specific contentions made by Roche, which is that coercion is implausible as alleged by the amended complaint. In fact the amended complaint, as you know, includes an affidavit from Dr. Riegel. And Dr. Riegel specifically reported that in or about 2013, representatives called the Buffalo Cardiology and Pulmonary Associates Coumadin Clinic to inform them that all of the patients of the Coumadin Clinic would have to start agreeing to test — or the physicians would have to agree that the patients would have to test at least every two weeks, or else they would not be allowed to continue participation in the Roche program.

What Roche didn't say is that "We're no longer going to provide services to the patients who are testing monthly."

They told the doctors that "You have to switch the patients over to testing every two weeks." So this isn't a situation where Roche decided to stop offering services to patients who required monthly testing. Instead, Roche called the physicians and attempted to make them change all of the patients over.

And in Mr. Allen's specific case, Roche was aware that Buffalo Cardiology had previously ordered INR testing pursuant to the

independent physician judgment, which we also explain in the complaint and in Dr. Riegel's affidavit is based on an algorithm physicians at Buffalo Cardiology developed. That algorithm required testing to be performed based on the previous result, so --

THE COURT: At the end of the day, the problem I have with this is, Dr. Riegel didn't sign off, and they stopped. So there's that -- you wrote 50 pages on this topic, but pretty much I've got to have a false claim. You know, I get it that -- I don't have any false claim with respect to Roche.

MR. DeNINNO: Well, the initial prescription that Roche had Dr. Riegel sign, which was because of the limited options for two to four tests per month, when Roche was aware that Dr. Riegel would have prescribed testing pursuant to the algorithm, that led to actual submissions by Roche before the dispute arose about whether or not Mr. Allen, when he received the letter from Roche telling him that he had missed a test and that's what led to this whole —

THE COURT: There were no false claims put in, right?

MR. DeNINNO: Your Honor, we allege that there are

because Roche --

THE COURT: So you're talking about the one false claim before they stopped?

MR. DeNINNO: That was the only actual claim that Roche knew, but that also leads me into the theory of the case

1 overall, which is that every time the defendants, including Roche, had a doctor sign one of these enrollment forms, and 2 really even before they signed the enrollment form, by 3 instituting this policy where they determine the test 4 5 frequency, they necessarily violated regulations that were express conditions of payment. The home INR testing is covered 7 by Medicare pursuant to a national coverage determination. That national coverage determination specifically says that 8 9 every test must comply with -- it's 42 CFR 410.32(a), which 10 says that tests not ordered by the physician who's treating the 11 beneficiary are not reasonable and necessary. They're also 12 bound by --13 THE COURT: But the physician ordered it, or at least 14 when he didn't order it, they stopped, and when they do order 15 it, they go. And that Reggie Walton case -- I don't know if you know what I'm talking about -- where he reconsidered --16 MR. DeNINNO: The Boston Heart. 17 18 THE COURT: Yes, Boston Heart, I should call it that. 19 I know Judge Walton. But basically the Boston Heart case says, if the doctor orders it, unless the doctor is improperly 20 21 induced, that's the end of the story. 22 MR. DeNINNO: Well, I think that case is particularly 23 on point with respect to Roche, at least as it relates to 24 Mr. Allen and other patients of the Buffalo Cardiology Clinic

because they contacted them and told them that they had to

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switch their patients over.

THE COURT: And they didn't do it. At least there's no proof that they did it.

MR. DeNINNO: Well, they did it with respect to Mr. Allen because Mr. Allen when he called in April of 2014 to report what his test result was, Buffalo Cardiology told him test again in a month, which was pursuant to their algorithm because he had had several tests --

THE COURT: Right, but then there were no claims put in.

MR. DeNINNO: Right, but all of the tests that were performed previous to that were based on Roche's improper mandate, and Dr. Riegel never signed an order based on his own independent physician judgment.

THE COURT: So just maybe I don't understand the chronology well enough. So Allen gets tested once a week, right? And then he says, "I don't need it once a week." And the doctor says, "He doesn't need it once a week," and then they stopped. Do I have this --

MR. DeNINNO: After Allen contacted Roche and he then, you know, realized that Roche was asking him to test in a manner that Dr. Riegel had not intended or that Dr. Riegel didn't believe was necessary, or wasn't pursuant to Dr. Riegel's independent physician judgment, then Roche informed him that they would no longer allow him to test.

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              THE COURT: Right, so they didn't submit false claims.
              MR. DeNINNO: Your Honor, we still contend that the
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     claim that they submitted, even --
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              THE COURT: Which claim, the first one?
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              MR. DeNINNO: Yes.
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              THE COURT: The very first one?
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              MR. DeNINNO: Yes.
              THE COURT: Well, then the first one, you're entitled
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     to at least one test. I mean, I --
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              MR. DeNINNO: Well, they have to perform four tests
     before they submit a claim, so each claim is the result of four
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     tests.
              THE COURT: So this case is about three claims?
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     could settle it tonight, even trebled. I mean, it's just --
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              MR. DeNINNO: I mean, it gets back to my point, your
     Honor, which is that it's the underlying policy that they
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     admittedly applied to every single patient, and, you know, the
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     falsity is their failure to comply with the regulations. And,
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     as I was saying, the very next regulation beyond the one that's
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     specifically incorporated in the coverage determination is the
     regulation that applies to independent diagnostic testing
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     facilities, which is what Roche is; and that regulation says
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     that all procedures performed by the IDTF must be specifically
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     ordered in writing by the physician. And this theory that if
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     they limit the options that physicians have and that is a valid
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     physician order, it reads out the entire -- you know, it reads
     out the word "specifically" from the regulation entirely, and
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     the regulation --
              THE COURT: Why? Why if it's ordered by a physician
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     as medically necessary and the physician isn't wrongfully
     induced? I get the --
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              MR. DeNINNO: The physician has to be able to exercise
     independent judgment.
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              THE COURT: But they don't have to provide a service,
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     right? I can't force them to provide a service that --
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              MR. DeNINNO: No, I think they do have to provide a
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     service.
              THE COURT: I see. So it's an affirmative obliqation
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     to provide it once a month, if so desired by a doctor, even if
     it doesn't cover their costs? I'd be going a long way, wouldn't
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16
     I?
              MR. DeNINNO: Not to provide it once a month, your
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     Honor. To provide it in accordance with physician
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    prescriptions.
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              THE COURT: Well, fine, provide it once a month as
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     prescribed by a doctor, even if it loses money.
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              MR. DeNINNO: Right. But, your Honor, they wouldn't
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    be prevented in that situation, even assuming that they're
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     losing money at once a month, which I'm not sure there's any
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     reason to make that assumption based on the --
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THE COURT: He alleges it. I don't know.
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              MR. DeNINNO: That being said, they can contact
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     doctors, they can contact patients, they can use truthful
     marketing to attempt to increase the amount of their sales.
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              THE COURT: So when you say -- and that was the one
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    piece that I did want to ask you about -- untruthful marketing,
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     that is one of the exceptions to this rule. So what are you
     referring to?
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              MR. DeNINNO: The complaint uses as an example that
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     Heneghan article. The complaint alleges that there were
     multiple citations to outdated articles, and then --
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              THE COURT: Where? Where? That's what I'm trying to
    understand.
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              MR. DeNINNO: The complaint alleges that they're in
    the defendant's marketing materials. The allegations --
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              THE COURT: Roche's marketing materials?
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              MR. DeNINNO: As to Roche, the allegations are on
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     their website, which the complaint refers to marketing --
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19
     sorry?
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              THE COURT: The allegation is that it's on Roche's
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     website?
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              MR. DeNINNO: The allegation of the complaint is that
     it's in the marketing materials. The reality is that it's on
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     their website.
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              And with respect to, your Honor, that Heneghan article
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1 that Roche cited --THE COURT: And you're saying on the website is the 2 2006, not the 2012, or is it both of them? 3 MR. DeNINNO: There is only reference to the 2006 4 5 article. THE COURT: Now as we sit here? Or are you 7 referring -- anyway --8 MR. DeNINNO: As of the time we filed the complaint. I am not sure about currently, your Honor. I can't say that. But the 2012 article --10 11 THE COURT: Can I just say, you know, everyone is a 12 product of their experience. I'm no different. So when I had 13 the Neurontin case, what was happening is, Pfizer was going 14 door to door with salesmen handing them false information, and there were big conventions paid for at which there were 15 presentations with false information to physicians, and there 16 were false consultancy agreements with physicians. So I had an 17 extreme case, I grant you, but you have to connect the -- I've 18 19 studied this area of law -- somehow connect the false marketing materials to the physician decision, and at least on here I 20 21 think what you're saying is, it was on the website? Is that 22 the closest you get to the physician? 23 MR. DeNINNO: Well, we also -- I mean, we have contact 24 from Roche to the Buffalo Cardiology Clinic, both to tell 25 patients to switch over, and later, after the dispute arose of

Mr. Allen, to try to mediate the dispute, for lack of a better word, through the clinic.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

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with Roche?

MR. DeNINNO: With respect, though -- let me just add, with respect to that 2012 article, it appears that Roche and I think maybe several of the other defendants take issue with the word "disclaimed." The actual article, the language of it were that "The 2006 conclusions were limited by methodological problems and inadequate reporting of important outcome data." The defendants used the 2006 article because it claims that there were reductions in incidences of stroke and hemorrhage and the other adverse outcomes that can happen if the Warfarin is not monitored correctly. The conclusions that were limited by methodological problems in the 2012 study were those adverse outcomes. They specifically found in the 2012 study that there was no statistically significant reduction in the adverse outcomes, except with regard to stroke in certain patient populations, but overall they said that after reviewing the data again, this isn't exactly what happened. So I take issue with the fact that the citation to the 2006 article to the exclusion of the 2012 article is a valid statement by omission. THE COURT: Okay, thank you. All right, so is that it

MR. DeNINNO: One second, your Honor.

The only other thing that I would say with regard to

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Roche is that this idea that they're entitled to rely on a physician order form that they have limited the choices of the physician, or they know that they're not giving the physician the opportunity to make an independent medical determination, I think means that that order form can't be a valid order. regulations would have no meaning if it wasn't assumed that the doctors will be making independent medical determinations. And the 410.33(d) specifically prohibits IDTFs from ordering tests based on their internal protocols, which is exactly what's happening here. They're getting doctors to sign these orders because the doctors, as Dr. Riegel explained, didn't have any other choice with regard to some of their patients. And in Mr. Allen's case, it was because he lived far away, but your Honor brought up another valid point, which is that patients can live right next door. If they're wheelchair-bound and they don't have the assistance to get them to the clinic to do the tests, then home monitoring is necessary; and in Mr. Allen's case, Dr. Riegel made a decision that it was medically necessary. THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Thank you, your Honor. MR. DeNINNO: THE COURT: Who's next? MR. KASSOF: I am, your Honor, Andrew Kassof. actually put together some slides that might --THE COURT: Well, have you shown it to them?

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              MR. KASSOF: I'm going to show it to them right now.
              THE COURT: That's always a little unfair. You've
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    been sitting here this morning.
              MR. KASSOF: Well, and in fact I'm only going to use
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     some, your Honor, because I think some of it was covered. I'm
     going to do my best not to repeat anything that was said
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    previously. May I approach, your Honor?
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              THE COURT: Yes, but just know, if this case proceeds,
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     I don't understand why you didn't show it to them first thing
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     this morning. This comes up all the time, and I think it's --
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     the last case I had, I ended up having to delay it for half an
     hour for counsel to even be able to read it.
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              MR. DeNINNO: Your Honor, we'll make an objection for
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     the record to not having an opportunity to read this beforehand.
              THE COURT: Well, do you want to wait? In other
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     words, I don't want it if there's something brand-new in there.
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              MR. KASSOF: There's nothing brand-new, but --
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              THE COURT: Let me put it this way. This is how I
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    handled the last one: If there's something you've not seen
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    before, a document or an argument, you pop up and say, "I move
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     to strike, " and I will strike it.
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              MR. KASSOF: Thank you, your Honor. Understood.
                                                                My
23
     apologies.
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              THE COURT: No, I understand, but you wouldn't like
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     someone to do it to you, right? I mean, just it's sort of like
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the Golden Rule: If you don't want someone to do it to you, don't do it to someone else. You'd probably be very upset if they came in with a stack against Alere that you didn't have time to think about.

MR. KASSOF: Well, my only response is, typically I would have done this last night. I take what your Honor is saying, and I'll definitely --

THE COURT: Okay, fine. Yes, it happens all the time. It's become my new pet peeve when I'm on panels, so --

MR. KASSOF: Well taken, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. KASSOF: The experience Mr. Allen had with Alere is a little bit different than with Roche, but the false claims are no more viable, and that's where I'm going to focus entirely on the allegations and experiences with Alere and try not to repeat at all the prior arguments, to the extent I can.

There are four key undisputed allegations, undisputed facts, because they're supported in the complaint with an affidavit by Dr. Riegel and by Mr. Allen, and that is that Mr. Allen had and used other testing options. Counsel for Roche went through those a lot. I'm just going to focus towards the tail end right before Mr. Allen went to Alere.

Mr. Allen knew Alere's requirements in advance and asked his doctor to enroll him anyway into the Alere program.

Mr. Allen's doctor certified to the medical necessity of two to

four times per week in an enrollment form submitted to Alere, and then Alere followed Dr. Riegel's prescription.

Your Honor, on Slide 2 I walk through a timeline. All of this is taken straight from the complaint and the affidavits. It's been hit extensively previously, so I don't need to walk through it all.

Once Mr. Allen moved to Canandaigua, he had already had experience testing at a hospital, a VA hospital, and at Dr. Riegel's clinic. During that period of time, Mr. Allen alleges that at times the amount of testing frequency had to change because he changed to a vegetarian diet for one period of time, and his medication was changed for another period of time, and he tested more frequently. Then he became, he said, more stable. He moved to Canandaigua, and he wanted at-home testing with Roche.

I think the contrast between what happened with Roche and Alere further explains why we don't believe this is a False Claims Act case, and I'll get into that in a second, but what's pretty important from our perspective, your Honor, is that just before Mr. Allen tested at Alere, he was testing at the F.F. Thompson Hospital, which was five and a half miles from his home. And on Slide 3, this is how he reached out to Alere. On January 7 — this is Exhibit K to the Allen affidavit — Mr. Allen wrote to Alere, and he explained that he just had moved from Buffalo to Canandaigua, so he's now 100 miles from

the old clinic that he attended with his doctor. And he said that it was very difficult to make that trip, so he was now testing at the F.F. Thompson Hospital here in Canandaigua.

"They do not do the finger stick, so I have to give blood from my arm. We need help in getting into a home testing program."

And that, to me, explains why Mr. Allen wanted to choose. It's not because it was a matter of convenience. He preferred the home finger stick method. When they're testing at home, your Honor, they prick the finger, and they put it on a strip and it goes into the meter, as opposed to at the hospital where the blood is drawn intravenously. Mr. Allen explained to Alere that he didn't like having the blood drawn intravenously, he preferred the finger stick, so he wanted to get into a home testing program. That was the reason he told Alere.

Alere wrote back two days later -- this is Exhibit L to the Allen affidavit -- and said that "Our program requires that you test at least two times a month. Although some physicians do require home testers to test weekly, that will be up to your physician." So they laid out their program, and three weeks later on Slide 5 is the physician form that Dr. Riegel submitted to Alere, and on this form it gave the two options as to Allen's program. They had a weekly option and a two- to four-month option, and he checked the two- to four-month option by hand. And it said clearly on it that "To

remain on service with Alere, patients must test and report a minimum of two times each month," and he certified to the medical necessity of that test. And what the form says is that — and Dr. Riegel signed it. Even the form says that Alere would not accept stamped signatures. It required the doctor to physically sign the form that was submitted, and it's certified. It says, "I certify that it is medically necessary for the patient to self-test frequently in order to maintain a stable INR, optimize its therapeutic effects, and avoid the complications identified on Warfarin's product labeling. I further certify that the patient's medical record contains supporting documentation to substantiate this medical need."

So that was what was submitted to Alere, and I concur with the points earlier that Alere is legally entitled to rely on that signed certification by the doctor.

So then --

THE COURT: Why won't Alere do it once a month?

MR. KASSOF: They had the same -- I mean, it's a

business decision that they made, which, I mean, it's not

alleged in the complaint, but Alere provides the monitor and

the strips, right, and then the meter that's at home, and then

the testing frequency is what ultimately pays for the meter.

So they made a business judgment to only allow patients into

the program who test frequently than more than once a month, so

either weekly or two to four --

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              THE COURT: And the theory is, that eventually pays
     off the meter?
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              MR. KASSOF: It does pay off. That's --
              THE COURT: And then do you have to give the meter
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    back?
           Do you know?
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              MR. KASSOF: I don't know. I --
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              THE COURT: You win it with enough strips?
              MR. KASSOF: I don't know -- what's that?
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              THE COURT: You get to keep it with enough strips?
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              MR. KASSOF: Well, we know that Mr. Allen, after he
     was exited from the Roche program, he actually tested at home
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     with the meter and strips, he alleges, so I suppose he still
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     continued to use the meter and the strips post- --
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              THE COURT: So you don't have to return it?
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              MR. KASSOF: -- I don't know. So, your Honor, at
     Slide 6, all I did was put a comparison of the allegations with
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     Roche versus Alere just to frame it. And with Roche, Dr. Riegel
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     ordered the weekly tests, so Roche lets him in the program.
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     then in July says Dr. Riegel and another physician signed on a
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     document that they submit to Roche that said, "We don't believe
     it's medically necessary to test twice a week." So Roche says
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     that "If it's not medically necessary, then you're out of our
     program." So contrast that with what happened with Alere.
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              So six months later Alere expressly told Mr. Allen
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     that "Our program requires twice a week. It's going to be up
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to your doctor." They get a signed certification.
Dr. Riegel signed the certification and ordered the testing.
Now he says that, not even effectively, he says, "I lied. That
wasn't true. At the time I didn't believe it was medically
necessary. Even though I told Alere, even though I knew it was
probably going to Medicare, I didn't believe it was medically
necessary for twice a week. I only think it was medically
necessary for once a week." He signed the certification
because he knew, I suspect, that if he said exactly what he
said to Roche, Alere would have said, "You're not allowed in
our program either." So he signed the certification certifying
that it's medically necessary to get into the Alere program so
he could do the finger stick once a month, so Alere let him
into the program.
         The fact that Mr. Allen's physician, Dr. Riegel, in
his medical judgment, for whatever the reason, chose to sign
that certification and tell Alere that "It's medically
necessary for my patient to get tested two to four times a
month," Alere has the absolute right to rely on that. It
doesn't mean Alere submitted false claims.
         THE COURT: All right, can you just jump ahead.
         MR. KASSOF: Sure.
         THE COURT: Are there any alleged false statements
made by you in your marketing of materials?
         MR. KASSOF: No, your Honor.
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              THE COURT: All right.
              MR. KASSOF: There's nothing in the complaint about
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     it.
              THE COURT: All right, now, what about the fact that
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     they claim you billed for three -- that was the thing that was
     unique to your client, that they billed twice for three rather
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     than the four.
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              MR. KASSOF: Exactly, because that's a coding --
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              THE COURT: The batch, the batch argument.
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              MR. KASSOF: I describe that as kind of like a coding
     claim theory versus this overarching false form claim.
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              THE COURT: Yes.
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              MR. KASSOF: So there are two claims that they
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     alleged, and just to put it into context, there literally are
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     only two claims at issue in this one. So it is a claim
     submitted on October 16, 2015, and a claim submitted on
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     December 2, 2016. That's it.
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              THE COURT: December 2, 2016?
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              MR. KASSOF: December 2, 2016, yes.
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              THE COURT: So a year later?
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              MR. KASSOF: Yes, one in October 16 of '15, December 6
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     of '16, so 14 months later. And we know that there's no
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     allegations that this was part of some massive scheme that
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     Alere was telling doctors --
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              THE COURT: So you've now looked into it. What
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     happened here? You're saying, was it a clerical error?
              MR. KASSOF: No. I mean, outside the complaint, I
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     can --
              THE COURT: Because I'm just saying, within the four
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     corners of the complaint, it was a false claim.
              MR. KASSOF: I don't believe it was.
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              THE COURT: Why? But I'm just trying to figure out
     what to do with it because if it's a clerical error which was
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     fixed, you go down one path in discovery. If it was a
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     practice, then you go down another path in discovery.
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              MR. KASSOF: So, first off, just to put it clearly
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     into perspective, we're talking about $221 on two claims.
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              THE COURT: I get it, but if you extrapolate and it
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     was happening a lot --
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              MR. KASSOF: I don't think you can extrapolate, your
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     Honor --
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              THE COURT: Why?
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              MR. KASSOF: -- as the first point. So they submitted
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     Exhibit 1 to their opposition to the motion to dismiss. They
     showed eight claims. They did a year period from March of '16
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     through March of '17, and they had eight claims. And they said
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     six of them were properly submitted after four tests. These
     were the two that were not. So they've only identified two
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     claims. I think under 9(b) and the other governing law, you
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     can't -- there's no scheme -- in fact their allegations because
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     of that submission, their allegations belie the theory that
     this was sort of a routine practice.
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              THE COURT: How long was he getting tested by you?
              MR. KASSOF: Well, he was entered into the program, so
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     at least two years, at least two years.
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              THE COURT: So why wouldn't it make sense just to look
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     at the two years' worth of data and see whether this was just
     an anomaly, inadvertent, not knowing, as opposed to just a
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     systemic -- I don't know what you'd call it -- accounting
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     practice, audit or some --
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              MR. KASSOF: I'm going to get there in two seconds --
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              THE COURT: Okay.
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              MR. KASSOF: -- as to why it's not, but you can't do
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     that anyway, though, your Honor, because they could have put in
     all of the claims. They did it for '16. They did it for '16.
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     They identified --
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              THE COURT: Do they have all of the claims?
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              MR. KASSOF: They went to Medicare.gov. And this is
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     why I think the reason why the claim doesn't --
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              THE COURT: I see.
              MR. KASSOF: They did two things. They pieced
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     together two pieces of information. They went on the Alere
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     website, and they gathered the tests that yielded numerical
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     values. When the strip was submitted into the monitor, it
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     yielded what its INR was. So they had the test dates that
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yielded numerical values. They then went to Medicare.gov, and they pulled Mr. Allen's claims that were submitted by Alere for this entire year period, okay? And only two times over the entire year did they say that Alere prematurely submitted claims after three tests and not four. All the other ones they say were perfectly fine as far as how they were submitted. THE COURT: For one year? MR. KASSOF: For one year, yes. THE COURT: So two out of twelve. MR. KASSOF: And I'm going to explain those two in a second, but there's no allegations that it was ever submitted any other time. They don't allege that it was because --THE COURT: And you're saying they had access to it? MR. KASSOF: They absolutely did, which they submitted as Exhibit 1 to their opposition to the motion to dismiss. THE COURT: All two years? MR. KASSOF: They did one year. They did March '16 to March '17, but there's no reason why they couldn't go further than that. Anyway, the reason why I don't think it states a false claim anyway, though, your Honor, is that they do not allege that he had no other failed blood tests or when -- what he alleges is that the tests on the strip yielded a numerical value. That's what they pulled off the website. THE COURT: I didn't understand what that meant when

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     you said it yielded -- don't they all? I mean --
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              MR. KASSOF: No, they don't.
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              THE COURT: Why?
              MR. KASSOF: Because you can prick your finger, put it
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     on the strip, put it into the meter, and you've used the strip
     in the meter, but it may not yield a numerical value. It may
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     have been how the blood was placed on the strip, or for some
     other reason, it didn't yield a number. It doesn't tell us
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     what your INR is.
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              THE COURT: Like a misfire, just it didn't --
              MR. KASSOF: Right. It's deemed like a failed test.
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              THE COURT: It's not just whether it's above or below
     a certain limit?
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              MR. KASSOF: Correct. The patient, though, has
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     tested. He's used one of his test strips into the meter, okay?
     They don't allege that you can't count that as a test, as part
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     of the four that were submitted to Medicare. And Mr. Allen
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     doesn't allege that he didn't have any failed tests during
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     those periods of time -- this is outside the complaint -- but
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     the truth is, is that he did. We know that he did because he
     submitted it to Alere. But he can't allege, he cannot
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     allege --
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              THE COURT: And you're allowed to submit a failed test
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     as one of your four?
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              MR. KASSOF: Yes, and they do not allege that Medicare
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     will not pay for inclusion of a failed test. They can't allege
     that because that's not true. They don't allege that. And
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     they don't allege that he didn't have any failed tests during
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     that period of time.
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              THE COURT: So why isn't this -- I have a problem with
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     it because under 9(b), they have met their obligation, who,
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     what, when, where, and why, unlike with most of these --
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              MR. KASSOF: On those two.
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              THE COURT: -- on those two, and the question is,
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     those are false claims. I think there's no de minimis
     requirement. And you're saying is that if you look at it, it
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     wasn't false at all. Don't I have to have something outside
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     the four corners of the record on it?
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              MR. KASSOF: Well, so I think they only get those two.
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     Okay, they only get those two, and I don't --
              THE COURT: Well, they may get two years' worth of
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     discovery, though.
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              MR. KASSOF: Well, to me, that's misusing 9(b) on that
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    because you then are saying: Well, they've alleged two.
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     They've alleged that there are no other ones for that period of
     a year, everything was properly submitted.
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              THE COURT: For a year.
              MR. KASSOF: But then let them go find another year
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     and see if they can go get discovery on that, when they haven't
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     alleged anywhere any allegation suggesting that --
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1 THE COURT: Okay, I hear your position. Thank you, 2 but we need to keep it going here, so --3 So let me just jump to you. Is it true -- let me just 4 get through one issue -- there are no allegations of false 5 marketing with respect to Alere? 6 MR. DeNINNO: No. Alere is another defendant who 7 used -- again, the complaint cites the Heneghan article as an 8 example. 9 THE COURT: And where is it? 10 MR. DeNINNO: It's on their website. Again, the 11 complaint refers to it as marketing materials, but outside the 12 complaint, it's on their website, and it's used to support a 13 proposition that weekly self-testing has determined that timing 14 therapeutic range is increased. In the Heneghan article, it 15 doesn't -- it's not even -- and this is explained in the complaint -- it's not even possible to determine how frequently 16 the subjects of that study were testing because it was a 17 retrospective analysis of fourteen different studies. I think 18 19 nine of them didn't require patients to disclose how 20 frequently --21 THE COURT: And with respect to the form, there was 22 nothing within the four corners of the form? Was there 23 anything that you were challenging? 24 MR. DeNINNO: As far as the --25 THE COURT: Alere.

MR. DeNINNO: The enrollment form, your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DeNINNO: Okay. No, I think the overarching point with regard to the enrollment forms is that these enrollment forms were used to implement the underlying false scheme, which is that they're requiring doctors to order tests and they're requiring patients to undergo tests at frequencies --

THE COURT: But there's no false marketing information in it? The question is that they don't give you the option of once a month? That's what the challenge is? I just want to understand it.

MR. DeNINNO: Yes, with regard to the forms. I will also say that the complaint does include other allegations of false statements made by Alere. Those false statements were made by Alere's representative to Mr. Allen to attempt to persuade Mr. Allen to participate in their home INR testing program. Specifically, it's attached to the complaint, the email itself, and it's quoted in significant part in the complaint that after Mr. Allen contacted Alere, a representative named Mary Wages wrote back to Mr. Allen on January 13, 2015, and said, "All the studies indicate that patients who have tested more frequently have fewer adverse events." And the complaint goes through and cites several other more recent, more authoritative studies which don't find that. And so that statement made by Ms. Wages to Mr. Allen in that email was

false, and it was made specifically to induce him to speak with his doctor about participation in Alere's home testing program.

After Mr. Allen responded to Ms. Wages that he was concerned that Medicare wouldn't cover testing that he hadn't previously needed pursuant to his doctor's order, on January 23, 2015, Ms. Wages responded, "Medicare will not question frequency of testing," which again is not accurate. And Mr. Allen went a step further with regard to Alere, and he contacted the Medicare administrative contractor for California, who confirmed in a written response to Mr. Allen, which is also attached to the complaint, that Medicare does not permit independent diagnostic testing facilities to order tests on behalf of patients, and that they would question the tests that were performed that weren't medically necessary. So again it's our position that that's another false statement made by Ms. Wages in an attempt to induce Mr. Allen, the patient, to speak with his physician about participation in their program.

THE COURT: But did she ever speak to the physician?

MR. DeNINNO: We don't allege that anybody from Alere
ever spoke directly to the physicians at Buffalo Cardiology,
but in a situation like this --

THE COURT: It's like me listening to those ads every night on TV, right?

MR. DeNINNO: Well, they're intended to make you go talk to your doctor about whether or not --

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THE COURT: Yes, they all are. Maybe we could just get all of them and go back to cereal ads. I --MR. DeNINNO: Not when they're truthful, though, your Honor. I mean, truthful advertising is obviously permitted. That's certainly not the allegation here. It's the falsity of the statements that she made with regard to what, you know, Medicare --THE COURT: So the argument is, if you induce a customer with false information and then he goes and asks for it from his doctor, your argument is, that's a fraudulent inducement? MR. DeNINNO: Well, it's a false statement that's material to the submission of false claims. THE COURT: Maybe. I mean, the doctor here seemed to have pretty strong views about it, so I'm not sure. At least with Riegel, he seemed to know what he was doing. MR. DeNINNO: Well, again, the false statements are specific examples that are indicative of the policies that they're imposing on every patient. I mean, these are specific

MR. DeNINNO: Well, again, the false statements are specific examples that are indicative of the policies that they're imposing on every patient. I mean, these are specific examples of false statements that were made. And the complaint alleges, again, that it's the underlying policy of requiring patients to test their INR at a frequency that the defendants, that Alere determined that violates the regulations and leads to a false claim, and so --

THE COURT: What about these strips; in other words,

whether there's three or four? We may need more evidence about it, but do you agree with what your brother says here, which is that essentially you're allowed to bill for strips that fail?

MR. DeNINNO: I don't agree with that, and I don't agree that we don't allege that. The billing code that they have to use to submit these claims is HCPCS Code G0249, which requires the IDTFs to provide services and supplies for four tests and to actually report the results of those tests to the physician. And, again, this is a factual allegation that's not included in the complaint —

THE COURT: So I just want to understand. So if you have a failed test -- as he says, you know, there wasn't enough blood, it was placed in the wrong spot, the equipment malfunctioned, whatever -- there was a test, a strip was sent in, and it got no numerical value, is there a regulation that says what you're supposed to do about that?

MR. DeNINNO: No, there's not. And I think there might be, and correct me if I'm wrong, but I think that what Mr. Kassof said was that the strips are put into the machine at home, and if the test does fail, it's up to the patient to call that in to somebody to let them know it failed. They're not connected or they're not mailed. There's a step where the patient reports that, so --

THE COURT: Well, how would he know if it just wasn't enough blood, for example?

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              MR. DeNINNO: I think the machine -- my understanding
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     is that the machine puts an error code rather than a result on
     its interface screen.
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              THE COURT: I'm just worried that this issue may need
 5
     some discovery, but not a lot.
              MR. DeNINNO: Well, your Honor, I also -- I wanted to
 7
     correct one issue for the record. The tests were not 14 months
     apart. They were consecutive tests. They were tests on
 8
     October 16 of 2016, not 2015, and the very next test on
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     December 2 of 2016.
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              THE COURT: All right, I see. I see. But that just
12
    may have been a --
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              MR. DeNINNO: Well, we allege, you know, in light of
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     all of the other underlying actions and conduct that are
15
     contained in the complaint, that this is just another of
    Alere's actions which are intended --
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              THE COURT: Do you have the other year's worth of
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    billings?
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              MR. DeNINNO: I don't have the other year's worth of
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     billings, and I'm not sure whether they're available.
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     exhibit that was attached to the complaint was provided because
22
     apparently on Alere's website, they continued to report the
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     previous year's test results, and that happened to be what was
     available at the time.
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              THE COURT: So let's suppose I order them to produce
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1 as part of automatic disclosure the two years' worth of data, and these are the only two, and they also present evidence that 2 3 the fourth one was a failed test, does the claim go away on 4 summary judgment? 5 MR. DeNINNO: Are you talking about just Mr. Allen, 6 your Honor? I mean, they're obviously providing these tests to 7 tens of thousands of patients, and the allegation is that this 8 was --9 THE COURT: Well, but if they prove everything was 10 kosher, then there's no inference of a fraudulent scheme 11 because the one or two examples of a fraudulent claim that you have, which if it turns out that it's not fraudulent, it 12 13 doesn't support an inference that it was broader. If it turns 14 out it was, perhaps it does, so -- anyway, that's what I'm thinking about. 15 MR. DeNINNO: Well, I would also say with regard to 16 17 that, your Honor, the idea that -- we certainly don't agree that a failed test can be counted as one of the four. They 18 19 have to report actual results. 20 THE COURT: I would just have to see the regs. not going to jump into that here. 21 22 MR. DeNINNO: Okay, I understand that, but --23 THE COURT: But it may not be fraudulent. In other 24 words, it may be a misunderstanding of the reg if it's not 25 clear. You say there's nothing clearly on point.

1 MR. DeNINNO: No, the regulation says that the test results have to be reported. It's the billing code. It's not 2 a regulation. The billing codes are adopted by the CMS program 3 manual. But that's where the direction comes that the IDPFs 4 5 have to actually perform and report. And if they are, if as has been suggested that they are --7 THE COURT: So you're saying the fourth, they should just report this is failed? 8 9 MR. DeNINNO: No, I think -- and I think that what 10 happens when you have a failed test is, you immediately use 11 another finger and do another test. You still have to perform 12 the test. You can't just not --13 THE COURT: Yes, just we're so far beyond the record, 14 I just don't know. 15 MR. DeNINNO: And, right, and that's not what we allege. But if in fact that is what they're doing and they're 16 reporting failed tests as though they're one of the four tests, 17 then that actually would reveal a more widespread systematic 18 19 failure that would require more discovery to find out whether 20 or not that's something that's being done --21 THE COURT: I don't know, but I'll think about that 22 one. I'll think about that one. All right, thank you. 23 MR. DeNINNO: Thank you. 24 THE COURT: All right, so now the question is, we got 25 going around what time, 10:00, 10:15 or something? What do we

1 want to do here? We have two more or three more? 2 MR. KRAUS: 10:13 we started, your Honor. THE COURT: 10:13? Well, thank you. Very good. 3 you want to do one more and then we take a break? 4 5 MR. KRAUS: I'm fine. It's your call, your Honor. 6 THE COURT: Why don't we have you go, and then we'll 7 take a break. 8 (Discussion off the record.) 9 MR. KRAUS: Thank you, your Honor. On behalf of 10 mdINR, and I won't repeat what's been said already. The points 11 that I would make on behalf of mdINR are, there is no falsity. 12 Our enrollment form is explicit that we are for weekly testing 13 patients only. So the complaint uses a lot of conclusory 14 labels like "no exercise of independent medical judgment" and "coercion," but there is no coercion, and there is no lack of 15 independent medical judgment when we tell the physician exactly 16 the service that we provide and ask the physician if he or she 17 wants to prescribe that. It's very straightforward. It's 18 19 nothing misleading, no --20 THE COURT: Is there any false information being 21 alleged against you? 22 MR. KRAUS: I think only to the extent that they 23 suggest one thing, that same study. It's I think in 24 Paragraph 1... There's a paragraph, and I'll get you the cite, 25 your Honor, but there's one paragraph where they say we use

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     that same study. I don't believe that a -- I think it's
    Paragraph 130.
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              THE COURT: Is it on your website?
              MR. KRAUS: It's not alleged. I don't believe it is,
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    but it's not alleged, so I can't say for sure.
              THE COURT: Do you have any information on the form
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     that's being challenged?
              MR. KRAUS: Yes, and it's explicit. It says exactly
 8
     what we do. We say what we do, and we mean what we say. It's
10
     on --
              THE COURT: An elephant is faithful one hundred
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12
    percent?
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              MR. KRAUS: That's where I was going. Exhibit TT, and
14
     it says explicitly, "I understand -- " this is under the
     statement, quote, "Statement of medical necessity and
15
    prescription, " and it goes through a number of different
16
     statements but then ends, "I understand that mdINR's PT/INR
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18
    monitoring service is for weekly testing patients only."
19
              THE COURT: So, okay, thank you.
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              MR. KRAUS: There you go. So that's --
              THE COURT: It's almost like -- you're the first one
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22
     that there's no claim alleged.
              MR. KRAUS: No. That's the other thing. So there's
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     no falsity. There's no 9(b). This is not a difficult 9(b)
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     case at all. If you apply what you did in Verrinder, it's out.
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It's not -- you don't even get access to the relaxed rule under
Duxbury because this is not third-party submission, this is not
indirect submission; it is direct submission alleged by mdINR;
and they have zero physician, zero patient, zero claims.
just doesn't state a claim.
         If you look at what the First Circuit just did in
Nargol in 2017, Nargol says Karvelas is still the law of the
circuit, just like you did in Verrinder, and it's a direct
claim and there's no allegations. Even, you know, I could talk
about other cases that they cite. None of them get them to a
place where they can satisfy 9(b). If you look at the Ge case,
the Ge case specifically says that the First Circuit is
doubtful that an "all claims," quote/unquote, theory without
providing any specifics would have passed 9(b).
        THE COURT: Thank you.
        MR. KRAUS: You're good?
        THE COURT: Yes, I'm good.
        MR. KRAUS: Public disclosure, we do think that
there's a public disclosure, and they're out on the public
disclosure bar.
         THE COURT: If I get there. This is a hard one for
you because there are no claims.
         MR. DeNINNO: I'm sorry?
        THE COURT: There are no claims that you've alleged.
        MR. DeNINNO: Well, we allege that -- as he pointed
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out, we allege that all of the claims were false. Especially
with regard to mdINR, they require every patient who
participates in the program to test exactly weekly. That's
exactly what's prohibited by 410.33(d), which --
         THE COURT: But only people who sign up and a doctor
says needed. I mean, are you alleging any false information?
         MR. DeNINNO: They do cite the Heneghan study. It's
again, like I said --
         THE COURT: It's on their website?
         MR. DeNINNO: It's on their website. They cite it for
the proposition that self-testing may reduce adverse events,
which is again, as I explained in response to Roche,
specifically what was found to be insufficient by the authors
in 2012.
         And, you know, your Honor, the other point is that
they are out there; they are offering these services to every
patient. They're not limiting it to people who only require
weekly testing. They --
         THE COURT: No, but it's to every patient who had a
doctor sign a form.
         MR. DeNINNO: Right, but they're not --
         THE COURT: You've got to get to the doctor somehow in
order to make this, you know, like a kickback, a fraud or
something.
         MR. DeNINNO: The doctors aren't being -- the signing
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of the form can't be a valid order because the doctors don't have any independent discretion. This is exactly what the Office of the Inspector General gets at with its guidelines, which again were cited by the Boston Heart case as being binding upon the laboratory. If the OIG requires forms to be developed in a way that promotes the conscious ordering of every individual test by the physicians —

THE COURT: I mean, I get your skepticism. Suddenly the 2008 Medicare regulation permits this expansion in funding, and, whoops, they'll only provide weekly or biweekly or nothing. I understand that you believe they've put this pressure on the doctors in order to afford the doctors' patients some access that they didn't otherwise have. I understand that. It's just a much harder claim than any because there are no false claims for at least three of these companies, four of these companies, none.

MR. DeNINNO: I have to respectfully disagree. Again, your Honor, the allegation is that all the claims are necessarily false when you don't allow a physician to make an independent judgment.

THE COURT: I'm just not going to accept that argument. I mean, have fun at the First Circuit. Just you've got to have something that shows that there was a connect to a doctor that made them fraudulently prescribe, and I'm just not sure one article on a website is enough, compared to what I've

seen before, which is so much more of a weighty set of evidence.

MR. DeNINNO: There is an additional false statement with regard to mdINR. Their representative, again, after being contacted by Mr. Allen and Mr. Allen specifically asking whether they would fill a prescription, as his doctor believed was medically necessary for I believe once and sometimes twice per month, on January 13, 2015, a Teresa Hoff Cimiluca responded that he should be one hundred percent covered by our service by Medicare, despite the fact that she had just been informed that it wasn't medically necessary for him to undergo testing any more than once, sometimes twice per month pursuant to Dr. Riegel's instruction.

THE COURT: All right, that's helpful.

MR. KRAUS: Your Honor, if I might, if you look at the statement that counsel just referred to, the statement says, "We are weekly testing only. Therefore, you and your physician have to agree to weekly testing to use our service." There's nothing misleading about it. It says exactly what the form says.

THE COURT: Well, and plus, right, "and you'll be covered one hundred percent"?

MR. KRAUS: If it's medically necessary and you test within the criterias, then that will be covered.

THE COURT: How many people do I have left?

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              MS. SHANAHAN: Three of us, your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Three of you. Are they -- well, I think
     we should take a ten- or fifteen-minute break, and then we'll
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     come back. Okay, thank you.
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              THE CLERK: All rise.
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              (A recess was taken, 11:21 a.m.)
 7
              (Resumed, 11:44 a.m.)
              THE COURT: Okay.
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              MS. SHANAHAN: Good morning, your Honor. Sara
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     Shanahan for Patient Home Monitoring. PHM is similarly
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     situated to mdINR. There are no false claims identified.
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     Patient Home Monitoring did not provide any services to
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     Mr. Allen, and there aren't any allegations in the complaint
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     that would point to any other patient or doctor tied to a
15
     particular claim.
              Similarly, we concur with the arguments that have been
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     made by the other defendants that there's no obligation for
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     Patient Home Monitoring to provide services beyond the niche
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19
     that it's designed its business to meet, which is weekly
20
     testers. And the --
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              THE COURT: Do you know, does the person keep the
22
     meter at the end in your company?
23
              MS. SHANAHAN: When it's done with the testing?
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              THE COURT: Yes.
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              MS. SHANAHAN: My understanding is that the meter is
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     given to the patient, and then the strips get re- --
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              THE COURT: And when the testing necessity is over,
     does it get returned?
 3
              MS. SHANAHAN: I don't know the answer to that.
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              THE COURT: No one seems to. We couldn't figure that
 6
     out.
 7
              Is yours?
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              MR. PEARLSTEIN: So I think the patient keeps it.
                                                                  As
     indicated here with Mr. Allen, he kept the Roche meter.
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              THE COURT: So any alleged misleading marketing
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     information?
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              MS. SHANAHAN: So there is the same allegation in
     Paragraph 130 of the complaint that PHM somehow marketed the
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14
     2006 Heneghan article, but there aren't any additional
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     allegations related to who, what, when, where, how.
              THE COURT: Anything on your form other than the form
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     itself?
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              MS. SHANAHAN: The form is very straightforward, your
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     Honor. It specifically identifies weekly testing. It
     specifically identifies in the certification --
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21
              THE COURT: But no representations as to the medical
22
     necessity of it?
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              MS. SHANAHAN: I mean, there's a specific
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     certification at the bottom that states that the doctor is
25
     certifying that the testing is medically --
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THE COURT: But no alleged misrepresentations within the body of the form?

MS. SHANAHAN: I don't believe so, other than the general argument that it should have been a blank instead of identifying weekly testing.

THE COURT: All right, thank you. All right.

MR. DeNINNO: Your Honor, with regard to Patient Home Monitoring, their website — and their website is linked in their motion to dismiss, so I think it's appropriate to bring up that their website does contain a citation again to that 2006 Heneghan article, again stating that patients capable of self-monitoring could benefit from a one-third reduction in death from all causes. Again, we think that is a statement that — in this particular case, I think that's a statement that doesn't exist at all, even in the 2006 article, just even taking out of the equation the fact that the authors question their own previous conclusions later on, well before this statement remained published on their website.

PHM, their complaint also includes a PowerPoint presentation that PHM gave to its investors -- I believe it's dated in 2010 -- in which they indicate that they're going to set up their business as a business systemization --

THE COURT: As a business?

MR. DeNINNO: Business systemization for physicians rather than a health benefit marketing of their services to

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physicians. This PowerPoint presentation suggests that
individual cardiology clinics might realize a benefit of
$250,000 per year if they refer their patients into the PHM
home monitoring program.
         THE COURT: How? I didn't understand that. Why would
it be a profit center for a doctor?
        MR. DeNINNO: Because the doctors get to bill -- it's
the very next HCPCS code, which is G0250 -- they get to bill
separately for interpreting the results.
         THE COURT: I see, because one would think that the
actual taking of blood at the clinic and then interpreting the
results would actually be more profitable.
        MR. DeNINNO: That's -- I don't think that's --
        THE COURT: No, I'm just --
        MR. DeNINNO: -- an unreasonable assertion. That's
just what they represent.
         THE COURT: Like, we were trying to figure out why
does a hospital take blood intravenously, whereas you could do
a pinprick, and we were wondering whether that's because you
could charge more money for it, thinking that hospitals are not
immuned to this. I would have thought that the clinic would
have preferred people coming in; they can charge for the nurse
and the taking of the blood and the reading.
        MR. DeNINNO: I don't know the answer to that
question, your Honor. I know that --
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THE COURT: Anyway, I just assume everybody is selfishly motivated, as long as it doesn't hurt the patient. I'm not saying anyone wants to hurt a patient, but that they try and get the one that's most profitable. No, you don't know.

Anyway, so that that's what you're relying on is the investment PowerPoint. Any evidence that that gets to a doctor at all?

MR. DeNINNO: Well, I mean, the admission that they make in their presentation to investors is that this is how they're going to market their services. And, your Honor, I think this also brings up a different point we didn't discuss earlier this morning, which is that there is an obligation under the Social Security Act to provide services economically. It's Section 42 U.S.C. 1320c-G(a)(1).

THE COURT: Good for you.

MR. DeNINNO: I know, it's a mouthful. Obviously I had to write it down. But there's precedent in this district for applying that regulation to find that claims are false, or at least not dismissed in a complaint alleging the claims are false, when laboratories performing blood tests, incidentally, developed protocols to maximize their profits. That's the Kneepkins v. Gambro Laboratories case. And there's other examples from outside the district as well. There is the Amedysis case which --

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              THE COURT: Yes, but I can't -- first of all, you
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     didn't sort of allege it that way, that I remember anyway.
     There's so much briefs on it. But at the end of the day, in
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     terms of economically, they're saying they need to have at
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     least four to pay off the equipment.
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              MR. DeNINNO: Well --
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              THE COURT: So if I'm going to jump into the economics
     of it, don't I have to know those kinds of things?
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              MR. DeNINNO: Yeah, I mean, I certainly think that --
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     well, to know, obviously we'd need more information, and that's
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     a factual issue that's beyond the complaint. I think that
     answers its own question, which is that it shouldn't be a
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     grounds for dismissal at the --
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              THE COURT: Did you allege that violation?
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              MR. DeNINNO: We alleged throughout the complaint that
     their policies were created to maximize their profits. We
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     didn't specifically cite to that --
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              THE COURT: To that statute.
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              MR. DeNINNO: -- to that statute, but throughout the
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     complaint, it indicates that the defendants had profit
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     maximization rather than patient health, and especially in the
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     paragraph discussing this PHM --
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              THE COURT: I'm assuming that's true, by the way, but
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     I'm not sure that's enough to be a False Claims Act violation.
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     It may be some other statutory violation, but you do have to do
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1 something false. MR. DeNINNO: Well, the falsity is that they are 2 intentionally culling out patients who are less profitable, and 3 they're not disclosing this when they're submitting their 4 5 claims that they're only offering services to patients. This is one of these half-truths or critical omissions that the 7 Supreme Court found in Escobar that still can amount to a false claim. 9 THE COURT: With respect to PHM, I'm correct that you 10 don't know of any specific false claim, and you're claiming all the claims are false? 11 MR. DeNINNO: That's correct, your Honor. 12 THE COURT: And that's true for the rest of them? 13 14 MR. DeNINNO: Right. Mr. Allen only actually 15 performed testing as part of the Roche and Alere testing 16 programs, but --THE COURT: That's right, and there's no other 17 18 information. All right, thank you. 19 All right, next one. MS. THORVALDSEN: Good afternoon, your Honor. 20 Thorvaldsen. I have two of the defendants, US Healthcare 21 22 Supply and also Advanced Cardio Services. 23 Like Patient Home Monitoring and like mdINR, there are 24 no specific claims at all alleged as to either of my clients. 25 Mr. Allen did not receive services either from US Healthcare or

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from Advanced Cardio Services. He never enrolled in their programs and merely received some information from each of them that he actually sought out. There's no allegation that either of my clients ever contacted any physician, whether it's Mr. Allen's or anybody else in particular.

THE COURT: Do you have this article on your website?

MS. THORVALDSEN: Your Honor, according to --

THE COURT: Websites, I should say, since you're representing two companies.

MS. THORVALDSEN: I do, and I'm sorry if addressing them both together confuses things, but in Paragraph 130 of the First Amended Complaint, my two clients, Advanced Cardio and US Healthcare Supply, are the two defendants who actually are not identified as having relied on and promoted this 2006 Heneghan article, so my two clients specifically did not rely on that.

THE COURT: And is there anything on your form that's alleged to be false other than not giving them the option of once a month?

MS. THORVALDSEN: So with respect to US Healthcare Supply, there's no enrollment form provided with the complaint or alleged at all. What's alleged with respect to US Healthcare is that when Mr. Allen contacted that company, he advised them that he would like to test on a monthly basis. They advised him that as an initial matter, they only accept weekly or biweekly testers, and that unless his doctor ordered that

frequency, he wouldn't be eligible to enroll in their program.

That's sort of where that one was left.

With respect to Advanced Cardio Services, there is an enrollment form. Their enrollment form, which is attached to the complaint as Exhibit JJ to the Allen affidavit, states under "Prescription and Certificate of Medical Necessity," it has a doctor certify that "It's medically necessary for this patient to self-test weekly in order to maintain a stable INR and avoid complications associated with Warfarin therapy." And it also states, "The patient's medical records support the medical need for this service," and it certifies that "Physician and patient understand that this service is for weekly self-testing patients only." So it's very clear, it's very transparent, as with mdINR.

The one caveat that I would add to that, in candor, is that in probably 5-point font under the test frequency provision on the form, it says, "Medicare recommends weekly testing."

THE COURT: So that's false, right?

MS. THORVALDSEN: Your Honor, I do not believe that there is a specific recommendation from Medicare that weekly testing is indicated, but I would submit that that on the form is superfluous once the doctor has certified that weekly testing is necessary for this particular patient, and that both the patient and physician understand that this service is only

for weekly testing patients. And, of course, your Honor, there's no evidence of this particular form being used by, seen by, or influencing any physician that used ACS's services.

THE COURT: But in some ways yours presents the

THE COURT: But in some ways yours presents the hardest case because it's the one form that actually -- it's not like something is on a website, and maybe a doctor saw it or a doctor didn't see it. That's the form the doctor has to sign, right?

MS. THORVALDSEN: That's correct. This provides for the physician to order the weekly testing. But, again, the form itself specifies that the physician has made the determination that this particular patient that is being enrolled requires weekly testing.

THE COURT: That's the hardest one I've heard yet, other than the strip thing, so --

MS. THORVALDSEN: Again, your Honor, there is no claim that any services were provided under this form. The form was provided to Mr. Allen in response to him reaching out to --

THE COURT: Well, his claim is one of these exceptions. They claim that everything was induced basically.

MS. THORVALDSEN: Correct, your Honor. I think plaintiff's theory as to Advanced Cardio Services would be that every claim that was ever submitted by Advanced Cardio Services for weekly INR testing, which would have been all of the services that they ever provided, would have been false based

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     on this one statement in the enrollment form.
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              THE COURT: Well, I don't know if I buy that, but is
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     it foreseeable that some are?
              MS. THORVALDSEN: Your Honor, I don't believe that's
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     the standard, and I think it would be implausible, given the
     fact that, again, by the time the doctor is ordering the weekly
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     testing, the doctor has already made the determination that the
     particular patient being enrolled requires weekly testing.
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              THE COURT: Is that still on the form?
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              MS. THORVALDSEN: I can't answer that, your Honor.
     don't know.
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              THE COURT: It shouldn't be.
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              MS. THORVALDSEN: Duly noted, your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Okay, all right, thank you.
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              MS. THORVALDSEN: Thank you, your Honor.
              MR. DeNINNO: Your Honor, I think, you know, that's an
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     important point. These forms, the way that the form was
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     communicated to Mr. Allen was that it was emailed to him after
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     he inquired about the Advanced Cardio Services. This is the
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     form that they used, that they provided to all patients and to
     all physicians in order to have them enrolled in their program;
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     and it contains, as I think we've just established, a false
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     statement that's necessarily associated with every claim that
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     they submitted.
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              THE COURT: But the other ones, she's got the weakest
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and the strongest case you've got because the other one doesn't even reference the article, what's it, US Health. It doesn't reference the article, doesn't -- there's nothing.

MR. DeNINNO: US Healthcare, I believe they don't even -- I'm not sure they have a website that discusses this at all, but --

THE COURT: You don't have the enrollment form. You don't have anything false that was sent. You have nothing.

MR. DeNINNO: Oh, your Honor, for US Healthcare we do. We have -- when Mr. Allen contacted US Healthcare, he again disclosed that he needed testing pursuant to his physician's order, which is weekly or biweekly, again, as we discussed earlier, based on the Buffalo Cardiology algorithm and what his previous tests had established; and a Kathryn Famularo responded and said that he should be a hundred percent covered. And then Ms. Famularo also told Mr. Allen that if he agreed to test weekly for the first month, or however long it took them to recoup the cost of the testing meter, that then they would honor the prescription issued by his treating physician, which again establishes that there's necessarily a false claim with respect to every patient. If they're requiring every patient to test weekly until they make sure that each patient is profitable, and then they start following doctors' orders, those initial claims have to be false. They're admitting that they're taking away the doctor's ability to prescribe testing

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    pursuant to their independent judgment.
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             THE COURT: Thank you.
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             MR. DeNINNO: May I --
             MR. GELB: Your Honor, Richard Gelb --
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              THE COURT: Did you have something else? I'm sorry.
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              MR. DeNINNO: I also wanted to say that Advanced
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    Cardio Services -- we kind of just skipped right over the US
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    Healthcare -- although there's not the statement on their
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    website, they do distribute a brochure to patients. And this
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     is another document that's produced to Mr. Allen just based on
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    his initial inquiry, and the brochure contains basically the
     same statement that the other websites have, which is,
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     "Medicare has determined that weekly testing compared to
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     traditional monthly lab tests can lead to fewer complications
    associated with coumadin therapy, " which, again, Medicare
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    hasn't made any such determinations. The only --
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              THE COURT: Who does that brochure get distributed to?
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             MR. DeNINNO: In the amended complaint, it got
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     distributed to Mr. Allen as soon as he inquired about services,
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     and the allegation is that that's submitted to any patient or
     any physician who inquires about services as part of --
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              THE COURT: Thank you. I'm sorry, I
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     jumped over that. Mr. Gelb.
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             MR. GELB: Thank you, your Honor. Your Honor, with
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     respect to CardioLink, this is a situation, based on the
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complaint, where the realtor (Sic) is trolling for cases.
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     There's no suggestion that he ever intended to use the
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     services --
              THE COURT: The relator?
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              MR. GELB: Yes, the relator -- that he intended to use
     the services and that he attempted to use the services.
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     form itself that he cites in the record has a field for
     "other." There's no allegation that if a doctor was coerced
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     not to fill in the field "other," there's no allegation that
     any claim was submitted inconsistent with any doctor's
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     prescriptions.
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              In addition, the DVD that they refer to, there's no
     allegation of the exact circumstances. A DVD was never
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     delivered to Mr. Allen.
              THE COURT: Why are you talking about the DVD?
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              MR. GELB: Well, he alleges that our client,
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     CardioLink, does not make face-to-face visits but rather uses a
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     DVD.
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              THE COURT: To sell the product to the doctor?
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              MR. GELB: Well, no. To instruct on how to use the
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     product.
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              THE COURT: How to use it. And so what does it say on
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     it? You know, you assume I know -- there are so many
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     defendants here and so many different allegations, I just want
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     you to remind me. What is the false statement alleged in the
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DVD?

MR. GELB: There's no false statement alleged in the DVD. He's never even gotten a DVD. I mean, I don't want to go beyond the complaint, but in fact the DVD --

THE COURT: So are there any alleged false statements made by you? You, your company, I mean?

MR. GELB: No. No, your Honor, there's no false statements that are specified. There's nothing to indicate that doctors were influenced on decision-making. There's no marketing materials cited. There's no actual documents that would support a false statement or a false record. It's just a phone call for what they put in quotes in the complaint, "the tech division of CardioLink." There's no allegation of what the tech division does. There's no allegation of what authority the person had to whom he spoke. There's no allegation that the person he spoke to had any knowledge about claim submission. There's no allegation that the person he spoke to had any knowledge about training, and there's no allegation that the person he spoke with would have any authority to bind the company.

THE COURT: But what did the person say allegedly?

MR. GELB: Well, what is characterized is, he said

that they submit forms even if they don't do testing; that if

the doctor puts in for testing on a less frequent basis, they

still submit forms.

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              THE COURT: False forms? I'm not understanding.
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              MR. GELB: In other words, what they're alleging is --
              THE COURT: That even if he's only tested once a
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     month, they'll put in claims for the other three weeks? Is
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     that it?
              MR. GELB: Yes, but there's no evidence of that.
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              THE COURT: I'm just trying to figure out what the
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     allegation is.
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              MR. GELB: What it says is, "However, as Allen
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     discovered during his conversation with Sheffel -- " that's the
     individual from CardioLink -- "goes a step further than each of
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     the other defendants, IDTFs, at least explicitly, and submits
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     the maximum number of claims for reimbursement to Medicare per
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     patient regardless of whether the patient actually took the
     test."
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              There's no reliable evidence to meet the standards of
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     9(b) and 12(b)(6). The form itself has a provision for
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     "other."
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              THE COURT: Okay, thank you.
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              So what was the claim against CardioLink?
              MR. DeNINNO: Your Honor, with regard to the DVD
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     issue, the national coverage determination that permits all of
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     the defendants to submit bills for home INR testing requires
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     that they assure that patients are provided face-to-face
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     training on the use of the testing meter before they're ever
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eligible to submit any claim for reimbursement for testing. When Mr. Allen contacted CardioLink, he was told that the training would be provided by mailing him a DVD. Mailing a DVD obviously is not face-to-face training, and therefore the allegation is that CardioLink was never eligible to submit any claims for home INR testing because they never satisfied the prerequisite that face-to-face training was provided to patients.

THE COURT: So this is a really different kind of claim. This isn't about false marketing or a coercive form.

This is about failure to give training face-to-face.

MR. Deninno: Right, and that's a prerequisite to submitting any claims at all. That's one of the allegations against CardioLink. As he also discussed, when Mr. Allen called, he was told by the CardioLink vice president of the tech division, which is how he identified himself, that, first of all, that CardioLink was required by Medicare to submit tests at least every two weeks or at least twice a month, which isn't true. Medicare doesn't require bills to be submitted to them at any frequency. They allow bills to be submitted after four tests are performed. And then this vice president also informed Mr. Allen that, because Mr. Allen inquired whether or not he could continue testing at the frequency that his physician prescribed, that he could test at whatever frequency he wanted, but that CardioLink was going to continue submitting

1 bills pursuant to their schedule, which is as though Mr. Allen was testing every week. 2 3 THE COURT: Okay. MR. GELB: Your Honor, if I may? 4 5 THE COURT: Yes. 6 MR. GELB: We're confined to the complaint, so we 7 would dispute these allegations. The point that I'm making is 8 that even if you accept it as true, there's no -- it's speculative what actually occurred. In other words, it's not a 9 10 situation where someone consumes services and did not get 11 training. It's an isolated phone call with somebody that he 12 happened to interpret the conversation, but it's totally 13 speculative of --14 THE COURT: Well, it's not speculative. It's what the guy said, but the question -- the question I'm struggling with 15 is without even one claim. I don't think the First Circuit 16 has -- it does have a more flexible standard, but without even 17 18 one claim, even assuming some fraudulent statements by an 19 employee or on the form, what do I do? I mean, that's the 20 legal question. I have to assume it's true that your person 21 said that they were doing something fraudulent. 22 MR. GELB: Not fraudulent. THE COURT: Well, it's what he says he's going to do, 23 24 is that "Regardless of the test, I'm going to submit the 25 claim." That's fraudulent, right?

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              MR. GELB: Yeah, but if the form says "other," then
     the only way the claim can be false is if the doctor's form was
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     altered, and there's no allegation that that occurred. There's
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     no allegation that --
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              THE COURT: I understand that, and that's why that's
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     the very narrow legal question I need to answer. Either
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     whether it's because of the form was bad for cardio services or
     your employee said something bad, does that case go forward
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     without even one claim?
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              MR. GELB: The form is distinguished from the others
     because --
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              THE COURT: You're not hearing me.
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              MR. GELB: I'm sorry.
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              THE COURT: At least if you took what that employee
     said as true, "It doesn't matter what you fill in on the form,
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     we're going to submit for claims, for multiple claims," you
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     know, per month, the four, then that's fraudulent; but I don't
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     have any evidence that it actually happened. And the First
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     Circuit has been pretty rough on saying you've got to have some
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     sense that there was at least one claim that was fraudulent,
     and that's what I'm struggling about.
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              MR. GELB: And, your Honor, if I may, I think the case
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     law also says that the complaint should not be a vehicle to
     find evidence to meet the standards of 9(b).
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              THE COURT: I understand that, but I -- I understand
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that. So what is the big case you're relying on to say even if 1 there's not one claim that's allegedly fraudulent? 2 MR. DeNINNO: Well, your Honor, there are a number of 3 cases in this circuit that have found that in situations where 4 5 the underlying conduct necessarily results in falsity in the claims submitted to the government, that it's not necessary to 7 plead specific false claims. 8 THE COURT: I understand that. I actually had one of 9 these yesterday where it just seems immediately foreseeable, 10 but here it's just really one big step removed from that. I 11 mean, here's some -- so I'm struggling with that, I have to 12 tell you. Is there a case where there's no claim, false claim at all? 13 14 MR. DeNINNO: Sure, your Honor. I believe that the United States ex rel Hutcheson v. Blackstone is --15 THE COURT: Hutcheson is what you're relying on, 16 because I know there's some that have tried to be more 17 flexible, but it's only if you know for a fact --18 19 MR. DeNINNO: Well, I agree, but that is what we 20 allege with regard to these underlying policies that mandate 21 the tests to be performed at the frequency --22 THE COURT: Can I tell you what the problem is? don't think I accept your core, if I haven't been clear, your 23 24 core tenet that, you know, just because they're requiring at

least bimonthly, that in and of itself is a False Claims

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violation. I think, as long as you have a doctor signing off on it who hasn't been induced by false information, that that's not a False Claims Act violation.

However, I've now got an example of one false form with false information in it. Now, is that an example of perhaps an admission that regardless of what you put there, we charge for the four? And then I have the slips issue, the three or four, where you've got a specific instance of a potential false claim, as opposed to this overarching thing, like, you're forcing doctors into this tough choice.

MR. DeNINNO: Well, your Honor, in those situations, again, the *Hutcheson* case, I think there are some other -- there are other cases.

THE COURT: Okay, I'll look. All right, so this is -Yes, Mr. Gelb?

MR. GELB: I don't think there's enough in the complaint to conclude that that was an admission. It could be a statement that was made, but the corporation, it only admits something if the person who says it has authority to bind the company, and that's not alleged.

MR. DeNINNO: Your Honor, it doesn't have to be an admission. These were presented as company -- the face-to-face training was presented as the policy of the company to send a DVD rather than provide face-to-face training.

THE COURT: All right, all right, all right, this is

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what I'm going to do: As I mentioned, the overarching theory I don't think I'm going to accept. There are alternative theories, some of which might fly, but all discovery is stayed except as to the Alere with these three or four. MR. KASSOF: Two. THE COURT: Two. No, no, whether or not you submit for three strips or four strips, and only allowed with respect to Mr. Allen's bills for the two years and what happened. And then if I find that there's a fraud, then I'll deal with whether or not it should be extrapolated, as opposed to a good-faith disagreement about what a regulation provides or even just a misimpression that you might have. So I think that can be done pretty quickly. You can probably get him his billing information in how long? MR. KASSOF: We can do, as per this, your Honor, within three weeks maybe? Because for sure we can do -- on the two claims, we can give exactly why it is that we submitted it --THE COURT: No, but just this whole billing issue, it's only two years, how long would it take? MR. KASSOF: Three or four weeks. THE COURT: So he can get the other year. And if there were a bunch of them, then you might have a problem. If there weren't a bunch of them, maybe -- well, if there are a

bunch of them, maybe there's a -- my law clerk actually looked

up the regulation, and it's not so clear actually -- maybe you agree with that, I don't know -- on what you're supposed to do if there's a bad test result. It may be an ambiguity in the regulation, do you report it or not? I'll just have to make whatever decision I make, but I think that's a very narrow range of discovery that can happen while I write this opinion. But otherwise I'm going to just have to take this under advisement, and I don't think it's likely I'm going to accept the overarching theory.

Also, my preliminary impression, which I don't intend to be held to, but it's just having something on the website —
I may look — it's probably going to be down by the time I get into my chambers — but, anyway, just having an old study on a website without direct ties to the doctor —

MR. DeNINNO: Your Honor, if I may --

THE COURT: I'm going to assume it's the website. I know you just said marketing material. I'm going to assume it's what you just said.

MR. DeNINNO: Well, to the extent, there is additional detail. The complaint pleads that as an example. It cites numerous other studies. We would request the opportunity to amend and provide additional --

THE COURT: Not right now you're not. We're going to rule it, and then I'll deal with what we're dealing with. This has been briefed to death. So I will take sort of the putative

amendment about the website, but I'm not sure that gets to the doctor is the thing. The only thing that's getting directly to the doctor is the thing on the form, that one company they had on the form.

MR. DeNINNO: Well, your Honor, as long as we're discussing the websites, and I'm not going to be able to identify specifically which defendants have which websites, but the majority, maybe all, of the defendants have specific subsections of their websites that are directly targeted to physicians.

THE COURT: It's too late now. It's just too late.

It's too late. We just went through the argument. It's 12:15.

I've just spent two and a half hours with you. I'm not going to start it up again. But, in any event, it's all under advisement except for the two years' worth of submitted claims with respect to Mr. Allen.

MR. DeNINNO: Your Honor, just one more.

MR. KASSOF: We'll do the two years as well, but we'll also, your Honor, provide the failed test information that we do have for the two claims that he's identified.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. DeNINNO: Your Honor, I just wanted to reiterate one more time, since we're talking about getting to the doctor, we do plead that Roche did contact, make direct contact to Buffalo Cardiology to induce Buffalo Cardiology to change their

1 patients over to the weekly testing. That's beyond just the website marketing materials. 2 3 THE COURT: But then they didn't. 4 MR. DeNINNO: No. The complaint and Dr. Riegel's 5 affidavit says that he did start signing them for other patients in addition to Mr. Allen that had previously been 7 testing pursuant to the Buffalo Cardiology --8 THE COURT: I thought with Allen, he said he doesn't 9 need it, so they stopped. 10 MR. DeNINNO: But the complaint also -- my only point, your Honor, is that we also allege that Roche contacted him 11 directly and had all of the patients who were previously tested 12 13 pursuant to their algorithm, which the algorithm is attached as 14 an exhibit; and if they had tested pursuant to the algorithm 15 and they had tests that were previously in range, then they would be directed, pursuant to the algorithm, to test in a 16 month, not in two weeks, as Roche started requiring. 17 18 THE COURT: Right, right. 19 MR. DeNINNO: So those are specific --20 THE COURT: So there's no evidence that the clinic 21 switched anyone. 22 MR. DeNINNO: But Dr. Riegel said that he signed, in addition to Allen, that he signed Roche's new prescription 23 24 slips with regard to other patients. 25 THE COURT: But he signed them. Anyway, I get the

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point. All right, thank you.
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              MR. PEARLSTEIN: Thank you, your Honor.
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              THE COURT: All right, thank you.
              THE CLERK: All rise.
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              (Adjourned, 12:18 p.m.)
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                          CERTIFICATE
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     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT )
     DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
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                                   ) ss.
     CITY OF BOSTON
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              I, Lee A. Marzilli, Official Federal Court Reporter,
 8
     do hereby certify that the foregoing transcript, Pages 1
     through 79 inclusive, was recorded by me stenographically at
     the time and place aforesaid in Civil Action No. 16-11372-PBS,
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11
     United States of America, et al v. James F. Allen, et al, and
12
     thereafter by me reduced to typewriting and is a true and
13
     accurate record of the proceedings.
14
              Dated this 7th day of May, 2018.
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                   /s/ Lee A. Marzilli
20
                   LEE A. MARZILLI, CRR
                   OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
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